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Objectives. This study explores associations between metacognitive beliefs and beliefs
about voices in patients with severe auditory verbal hallucinations, and their hypothesized
relationship with levels of depression and anxiety. Furthermore, it was hypothesized that
metacognitive beliefs are better able to explain differences in levels of depression and
anxiety, than beliefs about voices.
Design. Cross-sectional data were obtained from baseline measurements of a
randomized controlled trial. All patients (N = 77) met the criteria for a DSM-IV diagnosis
within the schizophrenia spectrum. A correlation analysis was conducted to explore the
associations between metacognitive beliefs and beliefs about voices. Regression analysis
was performed to test the second hypothesis.
Method. Metacognitive beliefs were measured using the MCQ-30. Beliefs about voices
were measured using the BAVQ-R. Furthermore, the Beck Depression Inventory-II and
the Beck Anxiety Inventory were applied to measure depression and anxiety. All analyses
were a priori controlled for gender and level of education.
Results. Significant associations were found between negative beliefs about voices and
negative metacognitive beliefs. One of the metacognitive beliefs, that is, perceived
uncontrollability and danger of thinking, proved to be a key variable in explaining
differences in levels of depression and anxiety and seemed to have greater explanatory
value than all of the beliefs about voices when analysed simultaneously.
Conclusions. The results offer modest support to models emphasizing the fact that
metacognitive beliefs are a core feature in the development and maintenance of
depression and anxiety in patients with severe auditory verbal hallucinations.
*Correspondence should be addressed to Bas van Oosterhout, PO BOX 909, 5600 AX, Eindhoven, The Netherlands (e-mail:
bj.van.oosterhout@dewoenselsepoort.nl).
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Practitioner points
Positive clinical implications:
 Further evidence for the importance of metacognitive beliefs.
 Specific emphasis on anxiety and depression in patients with severe hallucinations.
Limitations
 Small sample size.
 Cross-sectional data only.
According to cognitive models of psychopathology, it is the appraisal of certain
experiences rather than the experience itself that determines distress. This also applies to
psychotic experiences in general (e.g., Garety, Bebbington, Fowler, Freeman, & Kuipers,
2001) and, more specifically, to auditory verbal hallucinations (AVHs).
In a series of ground-breaking papers, Chadwick and Birchwood described an evolving
cognitive approach to understanding and treating auditory hallucinations. They demon-
strated that reactions to voicesweremediated by beliefs about the voices’ identity, power,
purpose, and the consequences of obedience and disobedience to the voices (Chadwick
& Birchwood, 1994). To measure the concepts of malevolence, benevolence, resistance,
and engagement, the authors developed the Beliefs About Voices Questionnaire (BAVQ,
Chadwick & Birchwood, 1995). They found that malevolent voices were associated with
fear and anger and were resisted, whereas benevolent voices were associated with
positive affect and were engaged with (Birchwood & Chadwick, 1997). In the revised
version of the BAVQ, the concept of omnipotencewas added to the questionnaire thereby
acknowledging new insights about the central importance of the power attributed to the
voices (BAVQ-R; Chadwick, Lees, & Birchwood, 2000).
Although these findings are informative, they do not necessarily imply causality. That
is, a third variable may well be responsible for covariance between beliefs about voices
and distress, for example, a common aetiological factor (e.g., trauma and trauma
symptoms; Andrew, Gray, & Snowden, 2008) or a psychological factor (e.g., self-esteem).
First of all, Birchwood et al. (2004) found that the feelings of powerlessness and
inferiority endured by voice hearers in their relationships with other people in general
(i.e., social ranking) are strongly linked to the attributed power of voices and feelings of
depression and distress caused by voices. Therefore, the appraisal of social power and
social rank may be a primary contributor to the appraisal of voice power and distress to
voices.
Another variable influencing the relationship between beliefs about voices and
distress is self-esteem. Individuals with more depression and lower self-esteem have
auditory hallucinations of more intensely negative content and greater severity, and
are more distressed by their auditory hallucinations (Smith et al., 2006). Other
research (e.g., Fannon et al., 2009) indicates that beliefs about voices and low self-
esteem independently contribute to depression in patients with persistent auditory
hallucinations.
A third important variable ismetacognition. The S-REFmodel (Wells&Mathews, 1994)
proposes that positive and negative metacognitive beliefs about worrying are responsible
for the development and maintenance of a cognitive-attentional syndrome which
is associated with psychological disorders. Morrison and Wells (2003) found that
dysfunctional metacognitions (or metacognitive beliefs) are a vulnerability factor for
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psychological disorders in general and for psychosis in particular. Patients with AVHs, in
particular, exhibited higher levels of dysfunctional metacognitive beliefs than delusional
patients, panic patients, and non-patient controls. The hallucinating patients scored
higher on negative beliefs about uncontrollability and danger and negative beliefs about
responsibility and superstition, compared with patients with persecutory beliefs. More
recently, Barkus et al. (2010) found that help-seeking at-risk mental state (ARMS) patients
differed from healthy volunteers on several domains of metacognition, with the former
showing higher levels of thoughts about uncontrollability and danger of thinking and
beliefs about superstition, punishment, and responsibility. Results showed that ARMS
patients and high-schizotypal healthy controls (i.e., prone to psychosis but not seeking
help) are similar in their positive beliefs about worry, but are significantly different in
other aspects of metacognition. More specifically, ARMS patients display significantly
higher levels of thoughts about uncontrollability and danger of thinking and beliefs about
superstition, punishment, and responsibility. In addition, metaphysical beliefs (metacog-
nitive beliefs regarding negative spiritual appraisal) about voices (e.g., ‘They mean I am
possessed’.) were found to be the only predictor of distress in non-patient voice hearers
(Morrison, Wells, & Nothard, 2002), which indicates the importance of metacognitive
beliefs in explaining distress in voice hearers. In conclusion, even though it is currently
unclear whether metacognitive beliefs play an important aetiological role in the way
patients react to their AVHs, it is clear that metacognitive beliefs are associated with
distress (Barkus et al., 2010; Jones& Fernyhough, 2006;Morrison, French, &Wells, 2007;
Morrison, Wells, & Nothard, 2000).
The current study addresses metacognitive beliefs and beliefs about voices and how
they are associated with feelings of anxiety and depression. In this study, beliefs about
voices were considered to be cognitive rather than metacognitive because, from a
patient’s perspective, beliefs about voices are beliefs about an external stimulus;
however, in the context of voices this distinction may be debatable.
Sufficient evidence is available to support metacognitive models of anxiety (Wells,
2005) and depression (Papageorgiou & Wells, 2003). In both depression and anxiety,
negative metacognitive beliefs about rumination prospectively predict symptomatology
even after statistically controlling for initial levels of symptoms and rumination
(Papageorgiou & Wells, 2003; Wells, 1997, 2005). It seems plausible that metacognitive
beliefs may also play a significant role in the aetiology and maintenance of symptoms of
anxiety and depression in psychotic patients. Brett, Johns, Peters, and McGuire (2009)
found maladaptive metacognitive beliefs in psychotic patients and ARMS patients to be
related more to high levels of general psychopathology (including anxiety and
depression) than to the presence of psychotic experiences. In particular, ‘General
negative beliefs about thoughts’ were elevated in (sub-)clinical groups compared with
non-patients. Indeed, depression often predates psychosis and there is evidence that a
depressed disposition marks the onset of psychotic disorder in individuals reporting
hallucinatory experiences (Krabbendam et al., 2005). It is also widely believed
knowledge that a negative disposition, low self-esteem and negative emotions can
contribute to the development and maintenance of psychosis and that symptoms of
depression and low self-esteem are common among patients with auditory hallucinations
(Fannon et al., 2009; Birchwood, Iqbal, Chadwick, & Trower, 2000; Krabbendam & van
Os, 2005).
Concerning beliefs about voices, Van der Gaag, Hageman, and Birchwood (2003)
found that depression was independently predicted by malevolent voice appraisals and
anxiety by power and benevolent voice appraisals, respectively. Chadwick et al. (2000)
Metacognitive beliefs and hallucinations 237
found positive associations between depression and voice omnipotence, malevolence
and voice resistance, and a negative association with voice engagement. Anxiety was also
related to voicemalevolence, voice resistance, and voice omnipotence and similarly there
was a negative association with voice engagement.
The relationship between different kinds of metacognitive beliefs and beliefs about
voices is the main topic of this study. A question not yet addressed in the literature is how
beliefs about voices are associated with different metacognitive beliefs. The metacogni-
tivemodel of GAD (Wells, 1997) argues that positivemetacognitive beliefs drive excessive
worry, and that negative metacognitive beliefs facilitate and intensify feelings of anxiety.
Morrison et al. (2000) found similar results for psychotic phenomena: positive beliefs
about psychotic experiences are associatedwith the occurrence of psychotic phenomena
and negative beliefs are associated with distress in response to them. Indeed, psychotic
symptoms such as voices (similar to worry and intrusive thoughts) are often viewed as
intrusions into awareness (Morrison, 1998). Based onWells (1997), Morrison (2001), and
Chadwick and Birchwood (1994), it is hypothesized that negative beliefs about voices
(i.e., malevolence, omnipotence, resistance) are associated with negative metacognitive
beliefs.
Furthermore, in the S-REF model it is assumed that transient mood disturbances
associated with negative appraisals of life events are amplified into clinically depressive
symptoms because the patient employs ruminative coping, threat monitoring, and other
types of behaviour that lock him or her into an emotion-focused, self-perpetuating
negative coping state. Similar to the S-REF model which emphasizes the importance of
metacognitive beliefs instead of specific dysfunctional (non-metacognitive) beliefs, it is
expected that in this study population metacognitive beliefs are better able to explain
differences in affective symptoms than specific beliefs about voices. To our knowledge,
this is the first time this question has been addressed.
This study explores associations between beliefs about voices and metacognitive
beliefs in patients with severe AVHs and their relative contribution to affective symptoms.
It is hypothesized that: (i) negative beliefs about voices (malevolence and omnipotence)
will be associated with negative metacognitive beliefs; and that (ii) metacognitive beliefs
will be better able to explain differences in affective symptomatology than beliefs about
voices in patients suffering from AVHs.
Answers to these questions are of clinical relevance as they can help us understand
affective symptoms in (for example) schizophrenia patients and may offer directions for
more effective treatment of our patients. Cognitive behavioural therapy (CBT) has proved
to be an effective way of reducing patients conviction in their beliefs about voices,
resulting in a reduction of distress in those suffering from psychosis in general (including
AVHs) (Gould,Mueser, Bolton,Mays,&Goff, 2004). The resultsmay elucidatewhy certain
patients develop depressive and anxiety symptoms while others do not and how these
symptoms can best be treated; furthermore, they may provide evidence for a more
metacognitive approach to treating patients.
Method
Cross-sectional data from measurements of metacognitive beliefs, beliefs about voices,
depression, and anxiety were collected from an efficacy study (randomized controlled
trial; RCT) of a treatment for patients with persisting AVHs. Other baselinemeasurements
included the Beck Cognitive Insight Scale (Beck, Baruch, Balter, Steer, &Warman, 2004),
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the Positive Outcome Scale (Dutch: PUL; Appelo & Herkema-Schouten, 2003), and the
Social Comparison Rating Scale to Voices (Allan & Gilbert, 1995), none of which were
included in this study. Baseline data were obtained before randomization. Regression
models included depression and anxiety as outcome variables and general metacognitive
beliefs, different beliefs about voices and possible confounders as explanatory variables.
Participants
Baseline measurements of a sample of 77 patients (52% men and 48% women,
Mage = 42.3 years, SD = 12.0, age range 21–64 years) suffering from AVHs were analysed.
The sample had a long history of AVHs (Mduration = 13.5 years, Mdnduration = 9 years,
range0–50 years) All patientswere treated in either a psychiatric institution (Parnassia, The
Hague and Reinier van Arkel, ‘s-Hertogenbosch) or a university hospital (UniversityMedical
Centre Utrecht). All participants were diagnosed with a DSM-IV axis-I disorder of the
schizophrenia spectrum (American Psychiatric Association, 1994): 69% paranoid schizo-
phrenia, 16% psychotic disorder NOS, 5% disorganized schizophrenia, and 10% other
categories. Psychiatric evaluationwasused to confirmDSM-IV axis-I diagnoses. Thepatients
tookpart in anRCT,whichevaluated anewCBT techniqueonAVHs. Inclusion criteriawere
moderate to high scores on the frequency of, the distress caused by, and the intensity of
their AVHs as measured by the PSYRATS-AHRS (Haddock, McCarron, Tarrier & Faragher,
1999: items 1, 9 and 10  3). This amounted to severe pharmacotherapy refractory AVHs
occurring daily, showing at least moderately intense distress and at least a moderate
disturbance of daily functioning due to the voices. Patients with primary addiction
diagnoses were excluded. All participants were informed that data could be used for
additional studies and signed an informedconsent form.Ethical approvalwas grantedby the
Medical Ethical Committee.
Measurements
Participants completed five questionnaires regarding general metacognitive beliefs,
specific beliefs about voices, depression, and anxiety.
To measure metacognitive beliefs, the shorter version of the Metacognitions
Questionnaire, the MCQ-30 was used (Wells & Cartwright-Hatton, 2004). This question-
naire measures individual differences in a selection of metacognitive beliefs, judgements
and monitoring tendencies considered important in the metacognitive model of
psychological disorders.
The questionnaire consists of 30 items divided into five domains assessing three
aspects of both positive and negative metacognitive beliefs, metacognitive monitoring,
and judgements of cognitive confidence on a 4-point Likert scale. The three aspects of
positive and negative metacognitive beliefs are as follows: (i) positive beliefs about worry
(six items; typical items include, for example: ‘Worrying helps me to get things sorted out
in my mind’ and ‘Worrying helps me cope’); (ii) negative beliefs about the controllability
of thoughts and corresponding danger (six items; typical items include, for example:
‘Worrying is dangerous for me’ and ‘I cannot ignore my worrying thoughts’); and (iii)
negative beliefs about thoughts in general, including: responsibility, punishment, and
superstition (six items; typical items include, for example: ‘Not being able to control my
thoughts is a sign of weakness’ and ‘If I did not control a worrying thought, and then it
happened, it would by my fault’). Metacognitive monitoring was operationalized as
cognitive self-consciousness (six items; typical items include, for example: ‘I think a lot
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about my thoughts’ and ‘I pay close attention to the way my mind works). Judgements of
cognitive confidence were also measured using six items (typical items include, for
example: ‘I have a poor memory’ and ‘My memory can be misleading’).
The MCQ-30 can be relatively easily applied and shows good internal consistency
(Cronbach’s alpha .93) and convergent validity, and an ‘acceptable’ to ‘good’ test–retest
reliability (Wells & Cartwright-Hatton, 2004).
The revised BAVQ-R (Chadwick et al., 2000) is a 25-item measure of people’s beliefs
about auditory hallucinations, and their emotional and behavioural reactions to them.
There are five subscales: three subscales relating to beliefs (i.e., malevolence, benevo-
lence, and omnipotence) and two subscales relating to emotional and behavioural
relationships to auditory hallucinations (i.e., resistance and engagement). Malevolence,
benevolence, and omnipotence each consist of six items (e.g., ‘My voice is punishing me
for something I have done’ [malevolence], ‘My voice wants to protect me’ [benevolence]
and ‘My voice is very powerful’ [omnipotence]). The resistance subscale has five items on
emotion (e.g., ‘My voice frightensme’) and four onbehaviour (e.g., ‘When I hearmy voice,
I usually tell it to leave me alone’). The engagement subscale has four items on emotion
(e.g., ‘My voice reassuresme’) and four onbehaviour (e.g., ‘When I hearmy voice, I usually
listen to it because Iwant to’). All responses are rated on a 4-point Likert scale.With amean
Cronbach’s alpha for the five subscales of .86 (range .74–.88), its psychometric qualities
can be considered ‘good’.
The Beck Depression Inventory-II (BDI-II, Beck, Steer & Brown, 1996) is a series of
21 questions developed to measure the level of intensity, severity, and depth of
depression in patients with psychiatric diagnoses. It is composed of 21 questions, all
of which are constructed to provide a means of assessing a specific symptom on a
4-point Likert scale common among people suffering from depression. Internal
consistency is ‘good’, with a Cronbach’s alpha coefficient of around .85 (Ambrosini
Metz, Bianchi, Rabinovich, & Undie, 1991).
The Beck Anxiety Inventory (BAI; Beck& Steer, 1993) consists of 21 questions on how
the subject had been feeling during the past week, expressed as common symptoms of
anxiety. Each question is rated on a 4-point Likert scale. Internal consistency ranges from
.92 to .94 in adults. Concurrent validity, correlation with the Hamilton Anxiety Rating
Scale-Revised, was .51. Therefore, its psychometric properties can be considered ‘good’
(Beck & Steer, 1993).
The PSYRATS-AHRS is a subscale of the Psychotic Symptom Rating Scales (PSYRATS;
Haddock et al., 1999). It is an 11-item, 5-point subscale (0–4) multidimensional measure
of auditory hallucinations. The 11 items of the auditory hallucination scale assess the
different dimensions of auditory hallucinations over the past week and can be clustered
into three factors: a physical characteristics factor (consisting of frequency, duration,
location, and loudness), an emotional characteristics factor (consisting of the amount and
degree of negative content and distress), and a cognitive interpretation factor (consisting
of disruption, belief about origin and attribution of control). The psychometric properties
of the PSYRATS have been investigated, and both the auditory hallucination scale and the
delusion scale show excellent inter-rater reliability and good validity (Drake, Haddock,
Tarrier, Bentall, & Lewis, 2007).
Before analysing the data, the internal reliability of all four instruments in the current
sample was assessed using Cronbach’s alpha statistic. Statistics ranged from .82 (BAVQ-R)
to .94 (BAI).With values greater than .70 the internal consistency of all instruments can be
considered ‘good’.
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Statistical analysis
All data were analysed using SPSS 17. Gender, age, highest level of education, and level of
antipsychotic medication were a priori included in the analyses as potential confounding
factors. Selection of confounders was either based on existing literature or on correlation
analysis of the current data. The influence of age, gender, and levels of medication on
depression are commonly acknowledged (e.g., age and depression: Gatz & Hurwicz,
1990; gender and depression: World Health Organization [WHO], 2012a; and medication
and depression: WHO, 2012b). The same applies to the influence of age, gender, and
levels of medication on anxiety (e.g., age and anxiety: Flint, 1994; gender and anxiety:
WHO, 2012a; and levels of medication and anxiety: Blanco et al., 2003). For education, a
correlation analysis showed significant medium Pearson’s correlations with anxiety
(.293, p < .05) and depression (.386, p < .01) which justifies entering it as a possible
confounder. To avoid overfitting of the following regression models an initial regression
analysis was then conducted with the possible confounders acting as predictors, with
depression and anxiety acting as outcome variables, to downsize the number of
confounders (Table 1). Gender and level of education remained possible confounders.
Secondly, Pearson’s correlation coefficients were calculated to establish correlations
between metacognitive beliefs and beliefs about voices. Finally, we performed two
hierarchical linear regression analyses with depression and anxiety acting as the outcome
variables, and the metacognitive beliefs and beliefs about voices (step 2) and the two
possible confounders (step 1) acting as predictor. All models were significant (p < .05).
All assumptions for multiple regression analysis were met according to Berry (1993).
Results
Demographic, clinical, and questionnaire characteristics of the sample are presented in
Table 2. All patients were using antipsychotic medication. To compare different levels of
antipsychotic medication, we used chlorpromazine equivalent doses as calculated by
Woods (2003). The sample included 40 men and 37 women. Mean levels of depression
and anxietyweremoderate to high: 35% (N = 27) had a score of 30 or higher on the BDI-II
which indicates severe depression and 42% (N = 32) of the sample scored 26 or more on
the BAI which indicates severe anxiety.
Table 1. Summary of regression analysis of possible confounders predicting depression and anxiety
(N = 77)
Predictor variable
Depression Anxiety
B SE B b B SE B b
Constant 24.579 8.811 18.003 10.898
Gender 7.417 2.805 .292* 6.795 3.469 .228***
Education 2.761 0.935 .331** 2.216 1.157 .226***
Age 0.033 1.116 .003 0.700 1.380 .059
Medication 0.118 1.041 .012 0.930 1.288 .083
Note. For depression R2 = .231 (p < .01); for anxiety R2 = .144 (p < .05); *Indicates significance at the
p < .05 level; **Indicates significance at the p < .01 level; ***Indicates significance at the p < .10 level
(tendency).
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Table 2. Descriptive measurements according to metacognitive domains, beliefs about voices, levels of
symptoms, highest level of education, age, and daily use of antipsychotic medication
Variable Range Mean SD
MCQ-30: Positive beliefs about worrying 6–23 10.47 4.28
MCQ-30: Uncontrollability 6–24 15.35 5.33
MCQ-30: Need to control thoughts 7–24 14.35 4.07
BAVQ-R Malevolence 0–18 11.95 4.35
BAVQ-R Benevolence 0–18 3.18 4.28
BAVQ-R Omnipotence 0–18 11.3 4.19
BDI: Depression 1–57 23.52 12.46
BAI: Anxiety 0–63 23.87 14.87
PSYRATS-AHRS 17–38 29.78 5.134
Highest level of education 1–7 4.26 1.529
Agea 2–6 3.78 1.253
Medicationb 0–8 3.16 1.387
Note. aCategorized: 0–9 = 0, 10–19 = 1, 20–29 = 2, etc.; bCategorized: 0–99 = 0, 100–199 = 1,
200–299 = 2, etc.
Table 3. Correlation matrix (Pearson’s r) of the beliefs about voices and metacognitive beliefs
Uncontrollability Need to control thoughts Positive beliefs about worry
Malevolence .358* .428* .165
Omnipotence .310* .315* .220
Benevolence .167 .085 .320*
Note. *Indicates significance at the p < .01 level.
Table 4. Summary of hierarchical regression analyses predicting depression and anxiety (N = 77)
Predictor variable
Depression Anxiety
B SE B b B SE B b
Step 1
Constant 24.407 6.209 25.154 7.719
Gender 7.157 2.750 .283* 6.299 3.419 .213
Education 2.706 0.899 .328** 2.391 1.117 2.47*
Step 2
Constant 4.366 7.670 7.336 9.914
Gender 2.750 2.687 .109 2.596 3.473 .088
Education 1.535 0.866 .186 1.459 1.119 .151
BAVQ: Malevolence 0.048 0.453 .016 0.777 0.586 .226
BAVQ: Benevolence 0.284 0.373 .090 0.350 0.482 .094
BAVQ: Omnipotence 0.575 0.407 .191 0.912 0.526 .259
MCQ: Uncontrollability 0.880 0.289 .374** 1.006 0.374 .374**
MCQ: Need to control 0.275 0.407 .086 0.048 0.527 .013
MCQ: Positive beliefs 0.052 0.338 .017 0.350 0.437 .100
Note. For depression: R2 = .223 (p < .01) for step 1, and DR2 = .199 (p < .01) for step 2; for anxiety:
R2 = .126 (p < .05) for step 1 and DR2 = .171 (p < .01) for step 2; *Indicates significance at the p < .05
level; **Indicates significance at the p < .01 level.
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Hypothesis (i): Negative beliefs about voices (malevolence and omnipotence) are associated
with negative metacognitive beliefs.
Results for this hypothesis are given in Table 3. ‘BAVQ-R malevolence’ and ‘BAVQ-R
omnipotence’ are associated with ‘MCQ-30 uncontrollability’ and ‘MCQ-30 need to
control thoughts’.
Hypothesis (ii): Metacognitive beliefs are better able to explain differences in variance in levels of
depression and anxiety than beliefs about voices in patients suffering fromAVHs.
Results for this hypothesis are given in Table 4. The total model including beliefs about
voices,metacognitve beliefs, and confounders accounted for 22% of the variation in levels
of depression, and 13% of the variation in levels of anxiety. After controlling for two
confounders only ‘MCQ uncontrollability’ was significantly positively associated with
both depression and anxiety (on a p < .01 level).
Discussion
To our knowledge, this is the first study in which both metacognitive beliefs and beliefs
about voices have been simultaneously compared with regard to their ability to explain
differences in severity of depression and anxiety in a group of patients with treatment-
refractory AVHs. After controlling for twopossible confounders, one of themetacognitive
beliefs concerning ‘uncontrollability of thoughts and corresponding danger’ appeared to
be relatively important after beliefs about voices were statistically controlled; this offers
further support for a metacognitive approach towards affective psychopathology in
psychotic patients. This is in accordancewithmetacognitivemodelswhich emphasize the
importance of metacognitive beliefs, instead of specific dysfunctional (non-metacogni-
tive) beliefs, in the transition from everyday worrying to psychopathology. Similar to the
field of depression (Papageorgiou & Wells, 2003) our findings show that, in our sample,
negative beliefs about worrying explain variance in the severity of depressive symptoms.
In addition, corresponding to Wells’ (1997) model of GAD, we found that negative
metacognitive beliefs are associatedwith feelings of anxiety. The current results, although
derived from a relatively small sample, suggest that this is also the case in patients suffering
from severe AVHs: in our sample variance in affective psychopathology is to some extent
explained by negative metacognitive beliefs.
Additional results are discussed below.
Specific beliefs about voices, anxiety, and depression
This study found no significant associations between beliefs about voices and depression
and anxiety. In one scientific review (Mawson, Cohen, & Berry, 2010) 26 studies on
hallucinations were compared. Several types of appraisals were found to be linked to
higher levels of distress in voice hearers, such as ‘voice malevolence’, and attitudes of
disapproval and rejection towards voices. Our modest results on the impact of beliefs
about voices may underline the importance of introducing other concepts (e.g.,
metacognition) to understand the pathway from psychotic symptomatology to affective
psychopathology.
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Associations between beliefs about voices and metacognitive beliefs
The results show that specific metacognitive beliefs are associated with specific beliefs
about voices. Even though no conclusions can be drawn as to causality it is possible that
dysfunctionalmetacognitive beliefs act as a vulnerability factor andmaybe responsible for
the covariance betweenbeliefs about voices and anxiety and depression in those suffering
from AVHs. Our results give some support to the proposal of Wells (1997), who assumed
that negative metacognitive beliefs are associated with feelings of anxiety. Similarly,
Morrison (2001) proposed that positive beliefs about psychotic experiences are
associated with the occurrence of psychotic phenomena and negative beliefs are
associated with distress in response to them. Furthermore, psychotic symptoms such as
voices (similar to worry and intrusive thoughts) are often viewed as intrusions into
awareness (Morrison, 1997). This underlines the idea that beliefs about voices and
metacognitive beliefs could be associated, which the current study confirms.
The sample that was included in our trial had similarities with other study samples.
Someof themain descriptives (age and duration: Fannon et al., 2009; Age:Morrison et al.,
2007; Morrison & Wells, 2003) were similar whereas others showed divergence
(diagnosis and gender: Fannon et al., 2009; Gender: Morrison et al., 2007; Morrison &
Wells, 2003), with our sample having a relatively large proportion of females.
In summary: this study shows that symptoms of depression and anxiety are to some
extent explainedby dysfunctional beliefs about cognitive processes andworrying, and are
not explained by dysfunctional (non-metacognitive) beliefs about voices.
Strengths
A strength of this study is that, to our knowledge, it is the first study of its kind to have
addressed the question as to whether beliefs about voices and metacognitive beliefs are
associated in a group of severely distressed patients with persistent AVHs and, more
importantly, in which both metacognitive beliefs and beliefs about voices are compared
simultaneously with regard to their ability to explain differences in severity levels of
depression and anxiety.
Another strong feature is that the study addressed and distinguished between
depression/anxiety and the general concept of distress, resulting in more specific
conclusions about their relationship to metacognitive beliefs and beliefs about voices.
Limitations
A first limitation is the fact that this study analysed cross-sectional data, and could
therefore not draw any conclusions with regard to causality, but only explain variance of
the considered factors. Strictly speaking, given the statistical method, it is possible that
elevations in beliefs about voices and metacognitive beliefs are the result of anxiety and
mood symptoms.
And secondly, as already suggested in the introduction, it is possible that other
variables (e.g., aetiological, psychological, genetic variables) may well be responsible for
the significant associations found betweenmetacognitive beliefs/beliefs about voices and
affective symptoms.
A third limitation is the use of self-report measures, which implies that we cannot rule
out a response bias, for example, social desirability.
A fourth limitation is the relatively small sample size. Considering guidelines provided
by Miles and Shevlin (2001) with the current number of predictors and sample size we
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would only be able to detect medium-to-large effects and therefore we cannot rule out
smaller, undetectable effects. Furthermore, our sample was screened to have moderate/
severe distress about voices and therefore represents a sample with reduced variance in
terms of beliefs about and responses to voices. A broader sample, including people with
lower distress about voices might have shown a different distribution of scores on
metacognitive beliefs and beliefs about voices.
A fifth and final limitation is that voice-related distress as measured by the PSYRATS
could not be examined because the PSYRATS had already been used as a screening
instrument for the primary RCT from which the data were obtained.
Therefore, in summary, it follows that in some aspects these results replicate and
extend earlier work in this field, that is, in patients suffering from persistent AVHs our
findings suggest that different domains of metacognitive beliefs and more specific beliefs
about voices are related, and that they may contribute to psychological disorder (S-REF
model, Wells & Matthews, 1996) and, more specifically, to depression and anxiety. An
important feature is the perceived high level of uncontrollability and danger of thoughts
(metacognitive belief).
These findings support the current trend in CBT for psychosis, in which particular
emphasis is placed on metacognition and cognitive biases in addition to the traditional
focus on content of thought (Garety et al., 2001; Morrison, 2001; Van der Gaag, 2006).
There is also evidence to suggest that catastrophic worrying (with strong metacognitive
beliefs about worry) is not only linked to voices but also to paranoid psychosis
(Morrison et al., 2010; Startup, Freeman, & Garety, 2007). These findings encourage
the development and implementation of training and therapy in the field of
schizophrenia focussing (indirectly) on metacognitive beliefs as performed earlier in
the field of anxiety disorders (Wells, 2009). Current initiatives focus primarily on
paranoid patients; however, the present results support the idea that, if there is a
causal link between dysfunctional metacognitive beliefs and affective symptoms,
metacognitive training may also be relevant in a group of chronically impaired patients
suffering from AVHs.
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